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In the past few years, we have seen the
birth and rapid growth of what almost
amounts to an entire new field of intellectual
activity. Reference is, of course, to that
field which we have chosen here to call
&dquo;weapons management,&dquo; but which might
as readily be labelled military policy, arms
control, disarmament, or even peace re-
search. Certainly the problems covered by
this field are far from new; human groups
have been arming, warring, disarming, and
rearming with deadly regularity for centu-
ries. The difference, however, is not in the
problem, but in the approach to it.
Until World War II, the preparation for,
conduct of, and recuperation from war was
essentially a pre-scientific enterprise, as was
the widespread effort to devise schemes for
its amelioration or elimination. But during
that last great war (the number of small
ones since easily surpasses a dozen) two
relatively new phenomena appeared; one
was the rapid increase in the rate of techno-
logical innovation, and the other the emer-
gence and acceptance of a mode of thought
known as operations research, operations
analysis, or systems analysis. Both played
a signal role in the war, especially in the
United Kingdom and the United States, and
they have continued to exert a profound
influence on the planning for World War III
not only in these two nations but in many
of the industrialized societies on both sides
of the contemporary division.
It was not, however, until the mid-1950’s
that the intellectual style characterized by
the operations analyst and his focus on man-
machine systems was brought to bear in any
significant way on problems which exceed
the limited area of strategic bombing or
sea-going or battlefield tactics. The applica-
bility of these intellectual innovations to
more large-scale problems during the past
decade was demonstrated by two important
developments in military procurement plan-
ning. One was the production planning
scheme known as PERT (Production Evalu-
ation and Review Technique) used to manip-
ulate the thousands of variables affecting
the design, testing, and ultimate production
of the Polaris and other weapons systems.
The other was in the field of military budg-
eting, exemplified in a study co-authored by
the present Comptroller in the United States
Department of Defense (Hitch and McKean,
1960). Once applied to these cumbersome 
&dquo;
social-planning problems, it was almost in- 
’
evitable that these approaches would soon
expand beyond the military preparedness
field.
This they did, and in the arms control or
weapons management area they were joined
by another significant intellectual develop-
ment : game theory. First fully articulated
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by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1947,
it reached its most sophisticated strategic
development in the work of Thomas Schell-
ing (1960), Anatol Rapoport (1960), and
Kenneth Boulding (1962). In due course
these two strands of thought were to be
joined by a rapid upsurge in the develop-
ment of mathematical models for social
science, and finally, by increasingly rigorous
quantitative techniques for the gathering and
interpreting of large-scale social and political
data. Today, all of these intellectual streams
are beginning to flow into an exciting and
promising river of research on problems of
war and peace. In a sense, intellectual innova-
tion for war may have begun to contribute
as much to planning for peace as techno-
logical innovation for war contributed to a
massive increase in the range and complexity
of peacetime consumer goods.
Now, none of these intellectual develop-
ments took place in a political vacuum; they
were both a contribution to, and a result of,
important strategic events. The most sig-
nificant of these-and it is more a process
than an event-was the growing awareness
that the very brilliance of technological in-
novation in weapons design had made the
use of these weapons increasingly dysfunc-
tional for political purposes. By the late
1950’s many military men were saying
that if these weapons were ever used,
they would have failed in their purpose;
deterrence had become the sane man’s
&dquo;substitute for military victory.&dquo; The most
impressive indication that one major power
had come to this realization was the creation,
in the United States, of an Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.
As a consequence of these political trends,
the ominous gap between the armers and the
disarmers had begun to narrow. Prepared-
ness in America was much less the private
domain of the short-sighted jingoist and the
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opportunistic politician, and disarmament
was much less the near-monopoly of the ir-
relevant utopian or pacifist. A common in-
tellectual ferment was stirring-and recruit-
ing-in both camps, and some tentative,
muted dialogue was beginning to be heard.
One promising indication was the accelerat-
ing appearance of scholarly writing, accentu-
ated by the publication, in successive years, of
two books which reflected the common in-
tellectual advances, yet produced appreciably
different policy conclusions (Snyder, 1961;
Singer, 1962).
Another promising harbinger-in addition
to the accelerated pace of scholarly re-
search-was the organization of an increas-
ing number of national and international
conferences on arms control, disarmament,
and peace research. Most of these meetings,
of necessity, included both the armers and
disarmers, and the dialogue was soon joined.
Several of these were formal enough to re-
quire some of the participants to prepare
papers in advance, and at least four of them
ultimately led to the publication of those
papers.
The first of these four was held at Endi-
cott House outside of Boston in May of
1960. Sponsored by the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, and financed largely
by the Johnson Foundation of Racine, Wis-
consin, it led to the publication of a special
issue of the Academy’s quarterly Daedalus;
this collection was later reissued under the
editorship of Donald G. Brennan and pub-
lished as Arms Control, Disarmament and
National Security (Brennan, 1961 ) . That
same summer of 1960 saw the Academy
(along with the Federation of American
Scientists) sponsor a follow-up three-month
Summer Study, eventuating in Arms Reduc-
tion : Program and Issues, edited by David
H. Frisch and financed by the Twentieth
Century Fund (Frisch, 1961 ) .1 1
1 The summer study, in which about 50
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In May, 1961, the American Assembly
(with Ford Foundation support) devoted a
three-day conference at Arden House in
Harriman, New York, to the deterrence and
disarmament problem, with the results ap-
pearing under Louis Henkin’s editorship of
Arms Control: Issues for the Public (Hen-
kin, 1961). Then, in December, 1961, Sey-
mour Melman organized a fourth symposium
to eventuate in a serious publication. That
meeting, held at Columbia University, sought
to broaden both the agenda and the intel-
lectual specialties represented, with the
result explicitly reflected in the title of Dis-
armament : Its Politics and Economics, also
published by the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (Melman, 1962).2
The present volume, then, is the fifth
major one to emerge out of a conference
on deterrence and disarmament, and it might
be useful to describe that conference and
compare its results with our predecessors, by
way of justifying the publication of yet
another arms control anthology. The Inter-
national Arms Control Symposium (in
the early planning it was Arms Control and
Disarmament, but the omission developed
somewhere along the way and found ex-
pression in thousands of brochures which
were too timely and expensive to destroy)
had its origins in a Faculty Seminar on
Arms Control and Disarmament which be-
gan at The University of Michigan in the
summer of 1961, with the support of the
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
and under the direction of Thomas Lough,
Norman Thoburn, Stephen Withey, and my-
self. Originally conceived to initiate and ac-
celerate arms control and disarmament re-
search on the Michigan campus, the Semi-
nar was soon enhanced by the attendance of
several engineers and operations analysts
from the Bendix Systems Division in Ann
Arbor. These were people with a strong
personal and professional commitment to
the subject, a range of expertise nicely com-
plementing that already present in the Semi-
nar, and perhaps most crucial, an interest in
finding financial support for their research.
Combined with the University’s Institute of
Science and Technology, as well as scholars
from other departments, these individuals
were soon preparing research proposals for
the Department of Defense and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and be-
fore too long we had received several con-
tracts from the latter.
Out of our ongoing contact with the
Agency the subject of a &dquo;winter study&dquo; arose,
with subsequent informal negotiation finally
producing plans for a four-day symposium
during the week before Christmas of 1962.
Under the general chairmanship of Russell
O’Neal, Bendix Vice-President for Engineer-
ing, and Roger Heyns, Dean of the Univer-
sity’s College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts, the committee also included William
P. Barth, Michael Radock, Norman Tho-
burn, and Cleland B. Wyllie from the Uni-
versity, and Phillip E. Chase, Robert G.
Forman, Donald J. Ritchie, Daniel H.
Schurz, and Ernest Van Valkenburg from
Bendix. Responsible for the seven open,
public sessions were Daniel C. Jones, of
Bendix, and Elton B. McNeil, of the Uni-
versity’s Department of Psychology, while
scholars and policy-makers participated at one
time or another, also produced for limited cir-
culation a pair of volumes known as the Col-
lected Papers and Non-Physical Inspection
Techniques. And at this writing another sum-
mer study (conducted at Wood’s Hole in 1962
by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
is scheduled for publication under the editorship
of Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk.
2 This volume, however, included only
twenty papers presented, plus two which were
added subsequently.
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John B. Teeple, of Bendix and I arranged
the eighteen closed, technical panels. Leav-
ing the background details, what general
considerations guided the selection of topics,
speakers, and discussants, and in what re-
gard did they differ from those guiding our
predecessors?
First of all, we had their experience to
build upon and to help us appraise the
strengths and weaknesses of the evolving
weapons management field. From that ap-
praisal, it seemed clear that the shift initiated
by Melman fit well into changes that were
already occurring both in international poli-
tics and the Western academic world.
Dominant among those changes was the be-
latedly increasing role of social scientists.
Whereas the emphasis in the Brennan, Frisch,
and Henkin volumes was pretty much on
the more directly relevant and short-run
military stability problem, the Columbia
conference explicitly sought a broadening
out into the more long-range socio-economic
and political realms. Moreover, the latter
conference had a much higher number of
social scientists participating than the seven,
one, and four in the previous meetings, al-
though only four of their papers were re-
tained in the published proceedings. Thus,
twenty-six of our forty-three authors were
social scientists, and only two or three could
be classified as psychologists, psychology
being the discipline which has tended most
often to be the social science representative
in arms control and peace research activities.
There were thirteen political scientists and
five economists, and a sprinkling from sociol-
ogy, history, and psychology. Another indi-
cation of the degree to which our predeces-
sors have helped in advancing the field is the
degree to which governmental policy-makers
were involved. Whereas there were one,
none, one, and two in the other four volumes,
nine of our speakers and slightly more of
our discussants came from a national govern-
ment or the United Nations Secretariat. And
whereas only nine, two, nine, and one repre-
sentatives from industry are found in them,
this conference had eleven speakers from the
world of business. Clearly arms control and
disarmament are no longer taboo in either
government or industry.
This symposium differed from the others
not only in composition but in the intellec-
tual orientation of its speakers and discus-
sants. We made no serious effort to cover
all the problem areas in the deterrence-to-
disarmament field, or to achieve any sort
of equitable balance between &dquo;hard liners&dquo;
and &dquo;soft liners.&dquo; Rather, we sought primar-
ily a mix of innocence and realism, fresh-
ness and sophistication, so that the hard-soft
dichotomy would be blurred in a problem-
oriented-as opposed to a policy-oriented-
context. For realism, we invited chairmen
and discussants with a fair amount of re-
search or policy experience in the subject
field, or more often, a small notch or two
away from that field. But for our speaker-
authors, we quite consciously sought peo-
ple-almost all of whom are scholars in
either the university or industrial research
setting-who had by no means reached the
limits of what they could contribute to that
problem area. Often these invitees were
surprised by their assignments and occasion-
ally they urged that they &dquo;knew nothing
about it.&dquo; Of course, the hope was that
these protestations of ignorance were merely
a reflection of the invitee’s unfamiliarity
with the particular way in which the prob-
lem was phrased, and that on further thought
the relevance of their prior research would
be evident. For the most part, we were not
disappointed, even though we did experience
the normal rate of turndowns.
Another advantage of these selection cri-
teria was to produce a measure of uninhibit-
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edness which had seemed to be on the wane.
Because a good many of the problems were
relatively unexplored and because a large
proportion of our authors were not yet
caught up in the decision-making struggle
(and one need not be in government, or even
consulting for government, to become so en-
meshed), the policy orientations were tem-
porarily obscured. When neither the subject
nor the speaker has yet been reduced to a
policy pigeon-hole, and the line-up of agen-
cies, offices and factions are still a matter of
either ignorance or indifference, the tend-
ency of the divisions to define the problem is
markedly vitiated, to the benefit of fuller
and more careful analysis.
Finally, this conference was able to do
something which the forerunners would have
found most difficult. Because of the degree
of spadework which the Brennan, Frisch,
Henkin, and Melman collections have ac-
complished, we were able to divert a con-
siderable amount of our attention to matters
of methodology. Though this was partly a
luxury, it also seemed to be very much a
necessity. Despite the impressive advances
noted earlier, the arms control and disarma-
ment field nevertheless seemed to be suf-
fering from a double standard. When a
scientist such as Jerome Wiesner calls for a
high degree of rigor and precision in design-
ing and evaluating weapons systems or sur-
veillance devices, while classifying political
and military problems as &dquo;too complicated
for rational, logical solutions,&dquo; and urging
that they &dquo;admit of insights, not answers&dquo;
(New Yorker, January 26, 1963, p. 60), it
is clear that the social science-physical science
gap is far from closed. This comment, plus
many others in the scholarly and popular
media, indicates that a large population of
physical scientists and engineers as well as
policy-makers believes that problems sur-
rounding the behavior of large-scale social
systems are not-and may never be-sus-
ceptible to scientific analysis. Thus, the
promising trend noted at the outset seemed
in danger of faltering, and as a consequence
three panels were specifically intended to
refute, or at least challenge, the emerging
double standard, and in them we sought to
raise some of the more awkward questions
of observation, measurement, and concep-
tualization in the &dquo;policy sciences&dquo; (Lerner
and Lasswell, 1951).
Though the seven papers in the final
&dquo;Research Frontier&dquo; section may seem, at
first blush, to have little relevance to the
problem of weapons management, this im-
pression would be correct only in the very
short run, and then not in all cases. For
example, the model employed in Rapoport’s
interpersonal experiment strongly suggests a
parallel to contemporary bargaining, both at
the conference table and in the ongoing ex-
change of bilateral threats and promises.
Similarly, both the Crow and Davis studies
represent an effort to replicate-in its es-
sentials-the strategic bargaining and con-
comitant changes in tension level which are
found to occur in &dquo;real&dquo; Soviet-American
relations. All three of these papers may be
thought of as attempts to simulate those
segments of world politics which seem most
germane to the probability of a stable deter-
rent relationship and a successfully negoti-
ated disarmament system.
The fourth and fifth papers, on the other
hand, seek to develop more sophisticated
statistical techniques for dealing with the
problem of compliance with a disarmament
treaty. The approach found in the Patterson-
Richardson study is quite similar to the one
now being explored by the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency in its attempts to cal-
culate the degree of inspection reliability
necessary to an adequate production cutoff
treaty. In Ole Holsti’s article, we find some
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promising advances toward the identification
and measurement of one of the most crucial,
but elusive, variables in international rela-
tions : tension. Finally, though Ralph Gold-
man’s paper was originally presented under
the domestic politics rubric, it is now set apart
in this section because of its imaginative
effort to formulate in more coherent and
operational terms the vexing problem of the
relationship between national and interna-
tional politics. Both conceptually and (to
a lesser extent) methodologically, it clearly
points to the research frontier in the manage-
ment of national weapons and international
conflict.
In conclusion, this volume-and the sym-
posium which it reflects-would seem to be
a promising extension of those that have
gone before. We have tried to build upon
and to improve upon the impressive en-
deavors of our predecessors, and the reader
will have to judge the measure of our suc-
cess. If the enterprise has, in fact, met with
some success, to that degree it may later be
said that concerned men, combining the
creativity and rigor of a scientific outlook
with a lively sense of moral awareness,
helped to deflect the nations from a path
whose most likely terminal was nuclear
holocaust.
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